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Abstract
We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equi-
libria in m-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be
computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of
the reals, or stated in terms of complexity classes, ∃R-complete, when m≥ 3. We
show that, unless they turn into trivial problems, they are ∃R-hard even for 3-player
zero-sum games.
We also obtain new results about several other decision problems. We show
that when m ≥ 3 the problems of deciding if a game has a Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium or deciding if a game has a strong Nash equilibrium are ∃R-complete.
The latter result rectifies a previous claim of NP-completeness in the literature. We
show that deciding if a game has an irrational valued Nash equilibrium is ∃R-hard,
answering a question of Bilò andMavronicolas, and address also the computational
complexity of deciding if a game has a rational valued Nash equilibrium. These
results also hold for 3-player zero-sum games.
Our proof methodology applies to corresponding decision problems about
symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games as well, and in particular our
new results carry over to the symmetric setting. Finally we show that deciding
whether a symmetric m-player games has a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium is
∃R-complete when m ≥ 3, answering a question of Garg, Mehta, Vazirani, and
Yazdanbod.
1 Introduction
Given a finite strategic form m-player game the most basic algorithmic problem is to
compute a Nash equilibrium, shown always to exist by Nash [22]. The computational
complexity of this problem was characterized in seminal work by Daskalakis, Gold-
berg, and Papadmitriou [13] and Chen and Deng [11] as PPAD-complete for 2-player
games and by Etessami and Yannakakis [14] as FIXP-complete for m-player games,
when m ≥ 3. Any 2-player game may be viewed as a 3-player zero-sum game by
adding a dummy player, thereby making the class of 3-player zero-sum games a natu-
ral class of games intermediate between 2-player and 3-player games. The problem of
∗This paper forms an extension of parts of the master’s thesis of the first author and has appeared previ-
ously in a preliminary form [3]. The second author is supported by the Independent Research Fund Denmark
under grant no. 9040-00433B.
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computing a Nash equilibrium for a 3-player zero-sum game is clearly PPAD-hard and
belongs to FIXP, but its precise complexity appears to be unknown.
Rather than settling for any Nash equilibrium, one might be interested in a Nash
equilibrium that satisfies a given property, e.g. giving each player at least a certain
payoff. Such a Nash equilibrium might of course not exist and therefore results in the
basic computational problem of deciding existence. In the setting of 2-player games,
the computational complexity of several such problems was proved to be NP-complete
by Gilboa and Zemel [17]. Conitzer and Sandholm [12] revisited these problems and
showed them, together with additional problems, to be NP-complete even for symmet-
ric games.
Only recently was the computational complexity of analogous problems in m-
player games determined, for m≥ 3. Schaefer and Štefankovicˇ [25] obtained the first
such result by proving ∃R-completeness of deciding existence of a Nash equilibrium
in which no action is played with probability larger than 12 by any player. Garg, Mehta,
Vazirani, and Yazdanbod [15] used this to also show ∃R-completeness for deciding if
a game has more than one Nash equilibrium, whether each player can ensure a given
payoff in a Nash equilibrium, and for the two problems of deciding whether the support
sets of the mixed strategies of a Nash equilibrium can belong to given sets or contain
given sets. In addition, by a symmetrization construction, they show that the analogue
to the latter two problems for symmetric Nash equilibria are ∃R-complete as well.
Bilò and Mavronicolas [5, 6] subsequently extended the results of Garg et al. to fur-
ther problems both about Nash equilibria and about symmetric Nash equilibria. They
show ∃R-completeness of deciding existence of a Nash equilibrium where all players
receive at most a given payoff, where the total payoff of the players is at least or at
most a given amount, whether the size of the supports of the mixed strategies all have
a certain minimum or maximum size, and finally whether a Nash equilibrium exists
that is not Pareto optimal or that is not a strong Nash equilibrium. All the analogous
problems about symmetric Nash equilibria are shown to be ∃R-complete as well.
1.1 Our Results
We revisit the problems about existence of Nash equilibria in m-player games, with
m ≥ 3, considered by Garg et al. and Bilò and Mavronicolas. In a zero-sum game the
total payoff of the players in any Nash equilibrium is of course 0, and any Nash equi-
librium is Pareto optimal. This renders the corresponding decision problems trivial in
the case of zero-sum games. We show except for these, all the problems considered by
Garg et al. and Bilò and Mavronicolas remain ∃R-hard for 3-player zero-sum games.
We obtain our results building on a recent more direct and simple proof of ∃R-hardness
of the initial ∃R-complete problem of Schaefer and Štefankovicˇ due to Hansen [18].
For completeness we give also comparably simpler proofs of ∃R-hardness for the prob-
lems about total payoff and existence of a non Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
We next show that deciding existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in an m-player
game with m≥ 3 is ∃R-complete, and likewise for the similar problem of deciding ex-
istence of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Gatti, Rocco, and Sandholm [16] proved
earlier that deciding if a given (rational valued) strategy profile x is a strong Nash equi-
librium can be done in polynomial time. They then erroneously concluded that the
problem of deciding existence of a strong Nash equilibrium is, as a consequence NP-
complete. A problem with this reasoning is that if a strong Nash equilibrium exists,
there is no guarantee that a rational valued strong Nash equilibrium exists. Even if one
disregards a concern about irrational valued strong Nash equilibria, it is possible that
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even when a rational valued strong Nash equilibrium exists, any rational valued strong
Nash equilibrium could require exponentially many bits to describe in standard binary
notation the numerators and denominators of the probabilities of the equilibrium strat-
egy profile. Nevertheless, our proof of ∃R-membership build on the idea behind the
polynomial time algorithm of Gatti et al. Our reduction for proving ∃R-hardness pro-
duces non-zero-sum games. The case of deciding existence of a Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium is, as already noted, trivial for the case of 3-player zero-sum games. We
leave the complexity of the deciding existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in 3-player
zero-sum games an open problem.
In another work, Bilò and Mavronicolas [4] considered the problems of deciding
whether an irrational valued Nash equilibrium exists and whether a rational valued
Nash equilibrium exists, proving both problems to be NP-hard. Bilò and Mavronicolas
asked if the problem about existence of an irrational valued Nash equilibria is hard for
the so-called square-root-sum problem. We confirm this, showing the problem to be
∃R-hard. We relate the problem about existence of rational valued Nash equilibria to
the existential theory of the rationals.
We next use a symmetrization construction similar to Garg et al. to translate all
problems considered to the analogous setting of decision problems about symmetric
Nash equilibria. Here we do not obtain qualitative improvements on existing results,
but give for completeness the simple proofs of these results in addition to our new
results.
A final problem we consider is of deciding existence of a nonsymmetric Nash equi-
librium of a given symmetric game. Mehta, Vazirani, and Yazdanbod [21] proved that
this problem is NP-complete for 2-player games, and Garg et al. [15] raised the ques-
tion of the complexity for m-player games with m ≥ 3. We show this problem to be
∃R-complete.
Our hardness proofs are presented for the special case of 3-player games, but extend
to m-player games for any fixed m > 3, in a similar way to previous works [15, 5, 6].
For the case of nonsymmetric games this is achieved by adding m− 3 dummy players
with suitably chosen actions sets and payoff functions (cf. [5]). Zero-sum games are,
of course, mainly interesting for 3-player games. For the case of symmetric games, the
m− 3 dummy players can be introduced prior to the symmetrization construction and
this together with the reductions that follow are easily generalized to m players.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Existential Theory of the Reals and Rationals
The existential theory of the reals Th∃(R) is the set of all true sentences over R of the
form ∃x1, . . . ,xn ∈ R : φ(x1, . . . ,xn), where φ is a quantifier free Boolean formula of
equalities and inequalities of polynomials with integer coefficients. The complexity
class ∃R is defined [25] as the closure of Th∃(R) under polynomial time many-one
reductions. Equivalently, ∃R is the constant-free Boolean part of the class NPR [8],
which is the analogue class to NP in the Blum-Shub-Smale model of computation [7].
It is straightforward to see that Th∃(R) is NP-hard (cf. [9]) and the decision procedure
by Canny [10] shows that Th∃(R) belongs to PSPACE. Thus it follows that NP⊆∃R⊆
PSPACE.
Wemay similarly consider the existential theory over the rationals Th∃(Q) and like-
wise form the complexity class ∃Q as the closure of Th∃(Q) under polynomial time
3
many-one reductions. While it is a long-standing open problem whether Th∃(Q) is
decidable, Koenigsmann [20] recently showed that already Th∀∃(Q), consisting of true
sentences in prenex form with a single block of universal quantifiers followed by a sin-
gle block of existential quantifiers, is undecidable. In contrast, the entire first order the-
ory Th(R) of the reals is decidable in EXPSPACE [23]. Schaefer and Štefankovicˇ [25]
show that the problem of deciding feasibility of a system of strict inequalities is com-
plete for ∃R. Since a system of strict inequalities that is feasible overR is also feasible
over Q, it follows that ∃R⊆ ∃Q.
The basic complete problem for ∃R and for ∃Q, is the problem of deciding whether
a system of quadratic equations with integer coefficients has a solution overR and over
Q, respectively [7]. We denote this problem over R as QUAD and the problem over Q
as QUADQ.
2.2 Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
A finite strategic form game G with m players is given by sets S1, . . . ,Sm of actions
(pure strategies) together with utility functions u1, . . . ,um : S1×·· ·×Sm→R. A choice
of an action ai ∈ Si for each player together form a pure strategy profile a=(a1, . . . ,am).
The game G is symmetric if S1 = · · · = Sm and for every permutation pi on [m],
every i ∈ [m] and every (a1, . . . ,am) ∈ S1 × ·· · × Sm it holds that ui(a1, . . . ,am) =
upi(i)(api(1), . . . ,api(m)). In other words, a game is symmetric if the players share the
same set of actions and the utility function of a player depends only on the action of
the player together with the multiset of actions of the other players.
Let ∆(Si) denote the set of probability distributions on Si. A (mixed) strategy for
Player i is an element xi ∈ ∆(Si). The support Supp(xi) is the set of actions given
strictly positive probability by xi. We say that xi is fully mixed if Supp(xi) = Si. A
strategy xi for each player i together form a strategy profile x= (x1, . . . ,xm). The utility
functions extend to strategy profiles by letting ui(x) = Ea∼x ui(a1, . . . ,am). We shall
also refer to ui(x) as the payoff of Player i.
Given a strategy profile x we let x−i = (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xm) denote the strate-
gies of all players except Player i. Given a strategy y ∈ Si for Player i, we let (x−i;y)
denote the strategy profile (x1, . . . ,xi−1,y,xi+1, . . . ,xm) formed by x−i and y. We may
also denote (x−i;y) by x\ y. We say that y is a best reply for Player i to x (or to x−i) if
ui(x\ y)≥ ui(x\ y′) for all y′ ∈ ∆(Si).
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile x where each individual strategy xi
is a best reply to x. As shown by Nash [22], every finite strategic form game G has
a Nash equilibrium. In a symmetric game G , a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) is
a Nash equilibrium where the strategies of all players are identical. Nash also proved
that every symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
A strategy profile x is Pareto optimal if there is no strategy profile x′ such that
ui(x) ≤ ui(x′) for all i, and u j(x) < u j(x′) for some j. A Nash equilibrium strategy
profile need not be Pareto optimal and a Pareto optimal strategy profile need not be
a Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile that is both a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto
optimal is called a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. The existence of a Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
A strong Nash equilibrium [1] (strong NE) is a strategy profile x for which there
is no non-empty set B ⊆ [m] for which all players i ∈ B can increase their payoff by
different strategies assuming players j ∈ [m]\B play according to x. Equivalently, x is a
strong Nash equilibrium if for every strategy profile x′ 6= x there exist i such that xi 6= x′i
and ui(x′)≤ ui(x). The existence of a strong Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
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3 Decision Problems about Nash Equilibria
Below we define the decision problems under consideration with names generally fol-
lowing Bilò and Mavronicolas [5]. The given input is a finite strategic form game G ,
together with auxiliary input depending on the particular problem. We let u denote a
rational number, k an integer, and Ti ⊆ Si a set of actions of Player i, for every i. We
describe the decision problem by stating the property a Nash equilibrium x whose ex-
istence is to be determined should satisfy. The problems are grouped together in four
groups each of which are covered in a separate subsection below.
Except for the last four problems, it is straightforward to prove membership in ∃R
by an explicit existentially quantified first-order formula. We prove ∃R membership of
∃PARETOOPTIMALNE and ∃STRONGNE in subsection 3.3 and discuss decidability
of ∃IRRATIONALNE and ∃RATIONALNE in subsection 3.4.
Problem Condition
∃NEWITHLARGEPAYOFFS ui(x)≥ u for all i.
∃NEWITHSMALLPAYOFFS ui(x)≤ u for all i.
∃NEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF ∑i ui(x)≥ u.
∃NEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF ∑i ui(x)≤ u.
∃NEINABALL xi(ai)≤ u for all i and ai ∈ Si.
∃SECONDNE x is not the only NE.
∃NEWITHLARGESUPPORTS |Supp(xi)| ≥ k for all i.
∃NEWITHSMALLSUPPORTS |Supp(xi)| ≤ k for all i.
∃NEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS Ti ⊆ Supp(xi) for all i.
∃NEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS Supp(xi)⊆ Ti for all i.
∃NONPARETOOPTIMALNE x is not Pareto optimal.
∃NONSTRONGNE x is not a strong NE.
∃PARETOOPTIMALNE x is Pareto optimal.
∃STRONGNE x is a strong NE.
∃IRRATIONALNE xi(ai) 6∈Q for some i and ai ∈ Si.
∃RATIONALNE xi(ai) ∈Q for all i and ai ∈ Si.
A key step (implicitly present) in the proof of the first ∃R-hardness result about
Nash equilibrium in 3-player games by Schaefer and Štefankovicˇ is a result due to
Schaefer [24] that QUAD remains ∃R-hard under the promise that either the given
quadratic system has no solutions or a solution exists in the unit ball B(0,1). For
our purposes the following variation [18, Proposition 2] will be more directly applica-
ble (which may easily be proved from the latter, cf. Section 3.4). Here we denote by
∆nc the standard corner n-simplex {x ∈ Rn | x≥ 0∧∑ni=1 xi ≤ 1}.
Proposition 1. It is ∃R-hard to decide if a given system of quadratic equations in n
variables and with integer coefficients has a solution under the promise that either the
system has no solutions or a solution z exists that is in the interior of ∆nc and also
satisfies zi ≤ 12 for all i and that ∑ni=1 zi ≥ 12 .
Schaefer and Štefankovicˇ showed that ∃NEINABALL is ∃R-hard for 3-player ga-
mes by first proving that the following problem is ∃R-hard: Given a continuous func-
tion f : B(0,1)→ B(0,1) mapping the unit ball to itself, where each coordinate func-
tion fi is given as a polynomial, and given a rational number r, is there a fixed point of
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f in the ball B(0,r)? The proof was then concluded by a transformation of Brouwer
functions into 3-player games by Etesammi and Yannakakis [14]. This latter reduction
is rather involved and goes though an intermediate construction of 10-player games.
More recently, Hansen [18] gave a simple and direct reduction from the above promise
version of QUAD to ∃NEINABALL.
The first step of this as well as our reductions is to transform the given quadratic
system over the corner simplex ∆nc into a homogeneous bilinear system over the stan-
dard n-simplex {x ∈ Rn+1 | x ≥ 0∧∑n+1i=1 xi = 1} which we denote by ∆n. In short,
this is done by introducing a set of new variables yi and new equations xi− yi = 0, re-
placing quadratic terms xix j by bilinear quadratic terms xiy j, and finally homogenizing
the entire system using the two equations ∑n+1i=1 xi = 1 and ∑
n+1
i=1 yi = 1 where xn+1 and
yn+1 are new slack variables. Doing this we arrive at the following statement (cf. [18,
Proposition 3]).
Proposition 2. It is ∃R-complete to decide if a system of homogeneous bilinear equa-
tions qk(x,y) = 0, k = 1, . . . , ℓ with integer coefficients has a solution x,y ∈ ∆n. It
remains ∃R-hard under the promise that either the system has no such solution or a
solution (x,x) exists where x belong to the relative interior of ∆n and further satisfies
xi ≤ 12 for all i.
3.1 Payoff Restricted Nash Equilibria
For proving the ∃R-hardness results we start by showing that it is ∃R-hard to decide if
a given zero-sum game has a Nash equilibrium in which each player receives payoff 0.
This is in contrast to the earlier work of Garg et al. [15] and Bilò and Mavronicolas [5,
6] that reduce from the ∃NEINABALL problem. On the other hand we do show ∃R-
hardness even under the promise that the Nash equilibrium also satisfies the condition
of ∃NEINABALL. The construction and proof below are modifications of proofs by
Hansen [18, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2].
Definition 1 (The 3-player zero-sum game G0). Let S be a system of homoge-
neous bilinear polynomials q1(x,y), . . . ,qℓ(x,y) with integer coefficients in variables
x= (x1, . . . ,xn+1) and y= (y1, . . . ,yn+1),
qk(x,y) =
n+1
∑
i=1
n+1
∑
j=1
a
(k)
i j xiy j .
We define the 3-player game G0(S ) as follows. The strategy set of Player 1 is
the set S1 = {1,−1}× {1,2, . . . , ℓ}. The strategy sets of Player 2 and Player 3 are
S2 = S3 = {1,2, . . . ,n+ 1}. The (integer) utility functions of the players are defined by
1
2u1((s,k), i, j) =−u2((s,k), i, j) =−u3((s,k), i, j) = sa
(k)
i j .
When the system S is understood by the context, we simply write G0 = G0(S ).
We think of the strategy (s,k) of Player 1 as corresponding to the polynomial qk to-
gether with a sign s, the strategy i of Player 2 as corresponding to xi and the strategy j
of Player 3 as corresponding to y j. We may thus identify mixed strategies of Player 2
and Player 3 with assignments to variables x,y ∈ ∆n ⊆ Rn+1.
The following observation is immediate from the definition of G0.
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Lemma 1. Any strategy profile (x,y) of Player 2 and Player 3 satisfies for every (s,k)∈
S1 the equation
1
2u1((s,k),x,y) =−u2((s,k),x,y) =−u3((s,k),x,y) = sqk(x,y) . (1)
Hence u1(z,x,y) = u2(z,x,y) = u3(z,x,y) = 0 when z is the uniform distribution on S1.
Consequentially, any Nash equilibrium payoff profile is of the form (2u,−u,−u), where
u≥ 0.
Next we relate solutions to the system S to Nash equilibria in G0.
Proposition 3. Let S be a system of homogeneous bilinear polynomials qk(x,y), k =
1, . . . , ℓ. If S has a solution (x,y) ∈ ∆n×∆n, then letting z be the uniform distribution
on S1, the strategy profile σ = (z,x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of G0 in which every player
receives payoff 0. If in addition (x,y) satisfies the promise of Proposition 2, then σ is
fully mixed, Player 2 and Player 3 use identical strategies, and no action is chosen with
probability more than 12 by any player. Conversely, if (z,x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of
G0 in which every player receives payoff 0, then (x,y) is a solution to S .
Proof. Suppose first that (x,y)∈∆n×∆n is a solution to S and let z be the uniform dis-
tribution on S1. By Equation (1) the strategy profile (x,y) of Player 2 and Player 3 en-
sures that all players receive payoff 0 regardless of which strategy is played by Player 1,
and likewise the strategy z of Player 1 ensures that all players receive payoff 0 regard-
less of the strategies of Player 2 and Player 3. This shows that σ is a Nash equilibrium
of G0, in which by Lemma 1 every player receives payoff 0. If (x,y) in addition satisfies
that the promise of Proposition 2 we have 0< xi = yi ≤ 12 . From this and our choice of
z, we have that σ is a fully mixed and that no action is chosen by a strategy of σ with
probability more than 12 .
Suppose on the other hand that σ = (z,x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of G0 in which
every player receives payoff 0. Suppose that qk(x,y) 6= 0 for some k. Then by Equa-
tion (1) we get that u1((sgn(qk(x,y)),k),x,y) = |2qk(x,y)| > 0, contradicting that σ is
a Nash equilibrium. Thus (x,y) is a solution to S .
Theorem 1. ∃NEWITHLARGEPAYOFFS and ∃NEWITHSMALLPAYOFFS are ∃R-
complete, even for 3-player zero-sum games.
Proof. For a strategy profile x in a zero-sum game G we have that ui(x) = 0, for all i,
if and only if ui(x)≥ 0, for all i, if and only if ui(x)≤ 0, for all i.
Thus Proposition 3 gives a reduction from the promise problem of Proposition 2,
thereby establishing ∃R-hardness of the problems ∃NEWITHLARGEPAYOFFS and
∃NEWITHSMALLPAYOFFS.
A simple change to the game G0 give ∃R-hardness for the two problems
∃NEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF and ∃NEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF. Naturally
we must give up the zero-sum property of the game.
Theorem 2 (Bilò and Mavronicolas [5]). ∃NEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF and
∃NEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF are ∃R-complete, even for 3-player games.
Proof. Define the game G ′0 from G0 with new utility functions u
′
1(x) = u1(x) and
u′2(x) = u
′
3(x) =−u1(x), and thus also u′2(x) = u′3(x) = 2u2(x) = 2u3(x), where u1,u2,
and u3 are the utility functions of G0. Clearly G ′0 has the same set of Nash equilibria as
G0. Now u′1(x)+u
′
2(x)+u
′
3(x) =−u1(x) and it follows that u′1(x)+u′2(x)+u′3(x)≥ 0 if
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and only if u1(x)≤ 0. By Lemma 1, any Nash equilibrium xmust satisfy the inequality
u1(x)≥ 0. Thus, a Nash equilibrium x satisfies the inequality u′1(x)+u′2(x)+u′3(x)≥ 0
if and only if u1(x) = u2(x) = u3(x) = 0. We conclude that Proposition 3 gives a reduc-
tion from the promise problem of Proposition 2 to ∃NEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF
thereby showing ∃R-hardness.
Similarly, define the game G ′′0 from G0 with new utility functions u
′′
1(x) = 3u1(x)
and u′′2(x) = u
′′
3(x) = −u1(x). Again, G ′′0 clearly has the same set of Nash equilib-
ria as G0. Now u′′1(x) + u
′′
2(x) + u
′′
3(x) = u1(x) and it follows that u
′′
1(x) + u
′′
2(x) +
u′′3(x)≤ 0 if and only if u1(x)≤ 0. Analogously to above we then obtain ∃R-hardness
for ∃NEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF.
3.2 Probability Restricted Nash Equilibria
A key property of the game G0 is that Player 1 may ensure all players receive payoff 0.
We now give all players this choice by playing a new additional action ⊥. We then
design the utility functions involving ⊥ in such a way that the pure strategy profile
(⊥,⊥,⊥) is always a Nash equilibrium, and every other Nash equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium in G0 in which all players receive payoff 0.
Definition 2. For u ≥ 0, let H1 = H1(u) be the 3-player zero-sum game where each
player has the action set {G,⊥} and the payoff vectors are given by the entries of the
following two matrices, where Player 1 selects the matrix, Player 2 selects the row,
Player 3 selects the column.
G ⊥
G (2u,−u,−u) ( 1,−1,0)
⊥ ( 1, 0,−1) (−4, 2,2)
G
G ⊥
G (0,0, 0) ( 2,−3,1)
⊥ (2,1,−3) (−2, 1,1)
⊥
It is straightforward to determine the Nash equilibria of H1.
Lemma 2. When u> 0, the only Nash equilibrium ofH1(u) is the pure strategy profile
(⊥,⊥,⊥). When u= 0 the only Nash equilibria of H1(u) are the pure strategy profiles
(G,G,G) and (⊥,⊥,⊥).
Proof. Let pi be the probability of Player i choosing the action G. Consider first the
case of u > 0. Then the action ⊥ is strictly dominating the action G for both Player 2
and Player 3. Hence any Nash equilibrium would require p2 = p3 = 0. The only best
reply for Player 1 is then p1 = 0 as well. Consider next the case of u= 0. In case p1 < 1,
again the action ⊥ is strictly dominating the action G for both Player 2 and Player 3,
and we conclude that p1 = p2 = p3 = 0 as before. Suppose now that p1 = 1. In a Nash
equilibrium we would have either p2 = p3 = 1 or p2 = p3 = 0. The former clearly
gives a Nash equilibrium whereas for p2 = p3 = 0 the only best reply for Player 1 is
p1 = 0.
We use the game H1(u) to extend the game G0. The action G of H1 represents
selecting an action from G0, and the payoff vector (2u,−u,−u) that is the result of all
players playing the action G is precisely of the form of the Nash equilibrium payoff
profile of G0.
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Definition 3 (The 3-player zero-sum game G1). Let G1 = G1(S ) be the game obtained
from G0(S ) as follows. Each player is given an additional action ⊥. When no player
plays the action ⊥, the payoffs are the same as in G0. When at least one player is
playing the action ⊥ the payoff are the same as in H1, where each action different
from ⊥ is translated to action G.
We next characterize the Nash equilibria in G1.
Proposition 4. The pure strategy profile (⊥,⊥,⊥) is a Nash equilibrium of G1. Any
other Nash equilibrium x in G1 is also a Nash equilibrium of G0 and is such that every
player receives payoff 0.
Proof. By Lemma 1 a Nash equilibrium of G1 induces a Nash equilibrium of H1(u),
where (2u,−u,−u) is a Nash equilibrium payoff profile of G0, by letting each player
play the action G with the total probability of which the actions of G0 are played. By
Lemma 2, any Nash equilibrium in G1 different from (⊥,⊥,⊥) must then be a Nash
equilibrium of G0 with Nash equilibrium payoff profile (0,0,0) as claimed.
Theorem 3. The following problems are ∃R-complete, even for 3-player
zero-sum games: ∃NEINABALL, ∃SECONDNE, ∃NEWITHLARGESUPPORTS,
∃NEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS, and ∃NEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS.
Proof. Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 together gives a reduction from the promise
problem of Proposition 2 to all of the problems under consideration when setting
the additional parameters as follows. For ∃NEINABALL we let u = 12 , we let k =
2 for ∃NEWITHLARGESUPPORTS, and lastly we let Ti be the set of all actions of
Player i except ⊥ for both of the problems ∃NEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS and
∃NEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS.
Remark 1. Except for the case of ∃SECONDNE, the results of Theorem 3 can also be
proved with the slightly simpler construction of adding an additional action ⊥ to the
players in G0 which when played by at least one player results in all players receiving
payoff 0.
To adapt the reduction of Theorem 3 to ∃NEWITHSMALLSUPPORTS we need to
replace the trivial Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) by a Nash equilibrium with large sup-
port.
Definition 4. Define the 2-player zero-sum game H2(k) as follows. The two players,
which we denote Player 2 and Player 3, have the same set of pure strategies S2 = S3 =
{0,1, . . . ,k− 1}. The utility functions are defined by
u2(a2,a3) =−u3(a2,a3) =


1 if a2 = a3
−1 if a2 ≡ a3+ 1 (mod k)
0 otherwise
We omit the easy analysis of the game H2(k).
Lemma 3. For any k ≥ 2, in the game H2(k) the strategy profile in which each action
is played with probability 1
k
is the unique Nash equilibrium and yields payoff 0 to both
players.
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Definition 5 (The 3-player zero-sum game G2). Let G2 = G2(S ) be the game obtained
from G1 as follows. The action ⊥ of Player 2 and Player 3 are replaced by the set
of actions (⊥, i), i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,k− 1}, where k is the maximum number of actions of
a player in G1. The payoff vector of the pure strategy profile (⊥,(⊥,a2),(⊥,a3)) is
(−2,1+ u2(a2,a3),1+ u3(a2,a3)), where u2 and u3 are the utility functions of the
game H2(k). Otherwise, when at least one player plays the action G, the payoff is as
in H1, where actions of the form (⊥, i) are translated to the action ⊥.
Theorem 4. ∃NEWITHSMALLSUPPORTS is ∃R-complete, even for 3-player zero-sum
games.
Proof. In G2, the strategy profile where Player 1 plays⊥ and Player 2 and Player 3 play
(⊥, i), with i chosen uniformly at random, is a Nash equilibrium that takes the role of
the Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) in G1. Consider now an arbitrary Nash equilibrium
in G2. In case all players play the action G with probability less than 1, Player 2 and
Player 3 must chose each action of the form (⊥, i) with the same probability, since H2
has a unique Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium induces a strategy profile in G1,
letting Player 2 and Player 3 play the action ⊥ with the total probability each player
placed on the actions (⊥, i). By definition of H2(k) the payoff vector of (⊥,⊥,⊥) in
G1 differs by at most 1 in each entry from the payoff vectors of (⊥,(⊥,a2),(⊥,a3)).
The proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 still holds when changing the payoff vector
of (⊥,⊥,⊥) by at most 1 in each coordinate. The strategy profile induced in G1 must
therefore be a Nash equilibrium in G1. We conclude that in a Nash equilibrium x of
G2, either Player 2 and Player 3 use strategies with support of size k or x is a Nash
equilibrium of G0, where every player uses a strategy of support size strictly less than k
and where every player receives payoff 0. Proposition 3 thus gives a reduction showing
∃R-hardness.
3.3 Pareto Optimal and Strong Nash Equilibria
For showing ∃R-hardness for ∃NONSTRONGNE we first analyze the StrongNash equi-
libria in the game H1.
Lemma 4. For u ≥ 0, the Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) of H1(u) is a strong Nash
equilibrium. For u = 0, the Nash equilibrium (G,G,G) of H1(u) is not a strong Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider first u = 0 and the Nash equilibrium (G,G,G). This is not a strong
Nash equilibrium, since for instance Player 1 and Player 2 could both increase their
payoff by playing the strategy profile (⊥,⊥,G). Consider next u ≥ 0 and the Nash
equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥). Since H1 is a zero-sum game it is sufficient to consider pos-
sible coalitions of two players. Player 2 and Player 3 are already receiving the largest
possible payoff given that Player 1 is playing the strategy⊥, and hence they do not have
a profitable deviation. Consider then, by symmetry, the coalition formed by Player 1
and Player 2, and let them play G with probabilities p1 and p2. A simple calcula-
tion shows that to increase the payoff of Player 1 requires p1p2+ 4p2− 2p1 > 0 and
to increase the payoff of Player 2 requires p1p2− 4p2+ p1 > 0. Adding these gives
p1(2p2−1)> 0 which implies p2 > 12 . But then p1p2−4p2+ p1 < 0. Thus (⊥,⊥,⊥)
is a strong Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 5. ∃NONSTRONGNE is ∃R-complete, even for 3-player zero-sum games.
Proof. Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 together give a reduction establishing ∃R-
hardness, since by Lemma 4 the Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) is a strong Nash equi-
librium, and a Nash equilibrium of G0 where every player receives payoff 0 is not a
strong Nash equilibrium.
In a zero-sum game, every strategy profile is Pareto optimal. Thus for showing
∃R-hardness of ∃NONPARETOOPTIMALNE we consider non-zero-sum games.
Definition 6. For u≥ 0, let H3 = H3(u) be the 3-player game given by the following
matrices, where Player 1 selects the matrix, Player 2 selects the row, Player 3 selects
the column.
G ⊥
G (2u,−u,−u) (0,0,0)
⊥ ( 0, 0, 0) (1,1,1)
G
G ⊥
G (0,0,0) (1,1,1)
⊥ (1,1,1) (2,2,2)
⊥
Lemma 5. When u> 0, the only Nash equilibrium ofH3(u) is the pure strategy profile
(⊥,⊥,⊥). When u= 0 the only Nash equilibria of H3(u) are the pure strategy profiles
(G,G,G) and (⊥,⊥,⊥). For u≥ 0, (⊥,⊥,⊥) is Pareto optimal. For u = 0, (G,G,G)
is not Pareto optimal.
Proof. When u= 0, clearly (G,G,G) is a Nash equilibrium, which is Pareto dominated
by (⊥,⊥,⊥). Likewise, clearly (⊥,⊥,⊥) is always a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
When u> 0, the actionG is strictly dominated by the action⊥ for Player 2 and Player 3,
and hence they play⊥ with probability 1 in a Nash equilibrium. The only best reply of
Player 1 is to play ⊥ with probability 1 as well.
Analogously to Definition 3 we define the game G3 = G3(S ) to be the game ex-
tending G0 with H3 replacing the role of H1 and analogously to Proposition 4 any
Nash equilibrium in G3 different from (⊥,⊥,⊥), which is Pareto optimal, must by
Lemma 5 be a Nash equilibrium of G0 with payoff profile (0,0,0), which is not Pareto
optimal. This gives the ∃R-hardness part of the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Bilò and Mavronicolas [5]). ∃NONPARETOOPTIMALNE is ∃R- com-
plete, even for 3-player games.
We next consider the problems ∃STRONGNE and ∃PARETOOPTIMALNE. We first
outline a proof of membership in ∃R, building on ideas of Gatti et al [16] and Hansen,
Hansen, Miltersen, and Sørensen [19]. Gatti et al. proved that deciding whether a given
strategy profile x of an m-player game G is a strong Nash equilibrium can be done in
polynomial time. The crucial insight behind this result that the question of whether
a coalition of k ≤ m players may all improve their payoff by together changing their
strategies can be recast into a question in a derived game about the minmax value of an
additional fictitious player that has only k strategies. Hansen et al. proved that in such
a game, the minmax value may be achieved by strategies of the other players that are
of support at most k.
Lemma 6 (Hansen et al. [19]). Let G be a m+ 1 player game and let k = |Sm+1|. If
there exists a strategy profile x of the first m players such that um+1(x;a) ≤ 0 for all
a ∈ Sm+1 then there also exists a strategy profile x′ of the first m players in which each
strategy has support size at most k and um+1(x
′;a)≤ 0 for all a ∈ Sm+1.
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We next give a generalization of the auxiliary game construction of Gatti et al. that
also allows us to treat Pareto optimal Nash equilibria at the same time.
Definition 7 (cf. Gatti et al [16]). Let G be an m-player game with strategy sets Si
and utility functions ui. Let x be a strategy profile of G and let B1∪˙B2∪˙B3 = [m]
be a partition of the players, let ki = |Bi| and k = k1 + k2. For ε > 0 consider the
(m+ 1)-player auxiliary game G ′ = G ′
x,ε,(B1,B2,B3)
defined as follows. For i ∈ B1 ∪B2
the strategy set of Player i is S′i = Si. For i ∈ B3 the strategy set of Player i is Si = {⊥}.
Finally, the strategy set of Player m+1 is B1∪B2. The utility function of Player m+1
is defined as as follows. Let a= (a′1, . . . ,a
′
m, j) be a pure strategy profile of G
′. Define
the strategy profile xa of G letting xai = ai for i∈ B1∪B2 and xai = xi for i ∈ B3. We then
let u′m+1(a) = u j(x)− u j(xa)+ ε for j ∈ B1 and u′m+1(a) = u j(x)− u j(xa) for j ∈ B2.
The following is immediate from the definition of G ′.
Lemma 7. There exist a strategy profile x′ in G that satisfies ui(x′)> ui(x) when i∈B1,
ui(x
′)≥ ui(x) when i ∈ B2, and x′i = xi when i ∈ B3 if and only if there exist ε > 0 and
a strategy x′ in G ′
x,ε,(B1,B2,B3)
of the first m players such that u′m+1(x
′, j) ≤ 0 for all
j ∈ B1∪B2.
The task of deciding if a strategy x is Pareto optimal amounts to checking the con-
dition of Lemma 7 for B1 = {i} and B2 = [m]\{i} for all i and to decide whether x is a
strong Nash equilibrium amounts to checking the condition for all nonempty B1 ⊆ [m]
while letting B2 = /0.
According to Lemma 6 we may restrict our attention to strategies x′ in G ′ of sup-
ports of size at most m. Fixing such a set of supports Ti ⊆ Si for i ∈ B1∪B2, we may
formulate the question of existence of a strategy x′, with Supp(x′i) ⊆ Ti for i ∈ B1∪B2
that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 7 as an existentially quantified first-order for-
mula over the reals. For a fixed x we need only 1+m2 existentially quantified variables
to describe ε and the strategy x′. Since this is a constant number of variables, when
as in our case m is a constant, the general decision procedure of Basu, Pollack, and
Roy [2] runs in polynomial time in the bitsize of coefficients, number of polynomials,
and their degrees, resulting in an overall polynomial time algorithm. Now, adding a
step of simply enumerating over all nonempty B1 ⊆ [m] and all support sets of size m
we obtain the result of Gatti el al. that deciding whether a given strategy profile x is a
strong Nash equilibrium can be done in polynomial time. The same holds in a similar
way for checking that a strategy profile is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
In our case, when proving ∃R membership the only input is the game G , whereas
the strategy profile x will be given by a block of existentially quantified variables. We
then need to show how to express that x is a Pareto optimal or a strong Nash equilibrium
by a quantifier free formula over the reals with free variables x. This will be possible
by the fact that quantifier elimination, rather than just decision, is possible for the first
order theory of the reals. The quantifier elimination procedure of Basu et al. [2] runs
in time exponential in the number of free variables, so we cannot apply it directly.
Instead we express the condition of Lemma 7 for a strategy profile x′ that is con-
strained by Supp(x′i)⊆ Ti for i∈ B1∪B2 in terms of additional free variables u˜′ that take
the place of the values of the utility function u′ of G ′. Since the supports of x′ are re-
stricted to size m, just mm+1 variables are needed to represent the utility to Player m+1
on every such pure strategy profile. For constant m, this is a constant number of vari-
ables, and thus the quantifier elimination procedure of Basu et al. runs in polynomial
time and outputs a quantifier free formula over the reals with free variables u˜′ that ex-
presses the condition of Lemma 7 when the utilities u′ are given by u˜′. After this we
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substitute expressions for the utilities u′ in terms of the variables x for the variables u˜′.
The final formula is obtained, in an analogous way to the decision question, by enumer-
ating over the appropriate sets B1 and B2 as well as all possible supports Ti, obtaining
a formula for each such choice and combining them to a single formula with free vari-
ables x expressing either that x is Pareto optimal or that x is a strong Nash equilibrium.
To the former we add the simple conditions of x being a Nash equilibrium. Finally we
existentially quantify over x and obtain a formula expressing either that G has a Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium or that G has a strong Nash equilibrium. Since this formula
was computed in polynomial time given G we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. ∃STRONGNE and ∃PARETOOPTIMALNE both belong to ∃R.
For showing ∃R-hardness we construct a new extension of G0.
Definition 8. For u≥ 0, let H4 = H4(u) be the 3-player game given by the following
matrices, where Player 1 selects the matrix, Player 2 selects the row, Player 3 selects
the column.
G ⊥
G ( 2u,−u,−u) (−3,−3, 0)
⊥ (−3, 0,−3) (−2,−2,−2)
G
G ⊥
G ( 0,−3,−3) (−2,−2,−2)
⊥ (−2,−2,−2) (−1,−1,−1)
⊥
Lemma 8. When u> 0, the only Nash equilibrium ofH4(u) is the pure strategy profile
(⊥,⊥,⊥). When u= 0, the only Nash equilibria ofH4(u) are the pure strategy profiles
(G,G,G) and (⊥,⊥,⊥). Furthermore, when u = 0, the Nash equilibrium (G,G,G) is
both a Pareto optimal and a strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof. When u= 0, clearly (G,G,G) is a Nash equilibrium, which is both Pareto opti-
mal and a strong Nash equilibrium. Likewise, clearly (⊥,⊥,⊥) is always a Nash equi-
librium. When u > 0, the action G is strictly dominated by the action ⊥ for Player 2
and Player 3, and hence they play⊥with probability 1 in a Nash equilibrium. The only
best reply of Player 1 is to play ⊥ with probability 1 as well.
Analogously to Definition 3 we define the game G4 = G4(S ) to be the game ex-
tending G0 with H4 replacing the role of H1. We next establish ∃R-hardness
Theorem 7. ∃PARETOOPTIMALNE and ∃STRONGNE are ∃R-complete, even for 3-
player games.
Proof. In G4, the strategy profile (⊥,⊥,⊥), with payoff profile (−1,−1,−1), is a
Nash equilibrium that is neither Pareto optimal or a strong Nash equilibrium, since
by Lemma 1 a strategy profile in G0 in which Player 1 plays an action according to the
uniform distribution has payoff profile (0,0,0).
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, any Nash equilibrium x in G4 different from
(⊥,⊥,⊥) must by Lemma 8 be a Nash equilibrium of G0 with payoff profile (0,0,0).
Since G0 is a zero-sum game, any strategy that is Pareto dominating x must involve the
strategy ⊥ and is thus ruled out by Lemma 8. Therefore x is Pareto-optimal. Now, x
is not necessarily a strong Nash equilibrium, but by Lemma 1, letting Player 1 instead
play an action of G0 according to the uniform distribution is also a Nash equilibrium
of G0 with payoff profile (0,0,0), that furthermore ensures that any strategy profile of
Player 2 and Player 3 in G0 does not improve their payoffs. Also, by Lemma 1, no
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coalition involving Player 1 can improve their payoff without playing the action⊥. No
coalition can however improve their payoff by a strategy profile involving the action⊥,
since all such payoff profiles result in a player receiving negative payoff. Thus x′ is a
strong Nash equilibrium.
We conclude that Proposition 3 gives a reduction showing ∃R-hardness of both
∃PARETOOPTIMALNE and ∃STRONGNE, thereby together with Proposition 5 com-
pleting the proof.
3.4 Irrational and Rational Nash Equilibria
Starting with a quadratic system in which every solution must involve an irrational
valued variable allows us to obtain ∃R-hardness for ∃IRRATIONALNE.
Theorem 8. ∃IRRATIONALNE is ∃R-hard, even for 3-player zero-sum games.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 constructs a polynomial time computable function
that takes a system S of quadratic equations and produces at new system S ′ of
quadratic equations S ′. From this construction it follows that there is an affine func-
tion F given by a matrix and a vector with rational entries such that the set of solutions
ofS ′ is the inverse image under F of the set of solutions ofS . Adding to S the equa-
tion x2− 2= 0, where x is a new variable, ensures that every solution of S and hence
S ′ is not rational valued. This also holds for the homogeneous bilinear system of equa-
tions S ′′ obtained from S ′ by Proposition 2. By Proposition 3 any Nash equilibrium
of G0(S ′′) with payoff profile (0,0,0) is thereby not rational valued. We conclude that
Proposition 4 gives a reduction showing ∃R-hardness of ∃IRRATIONALNE, since the
Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) of G1(S ′′) is a rational valued strategy profile.
While Theorem 8 shows that deciding whether a Nash equilibrium that is not ratio-
nal valued exists is ∃R-hard, we do not know whether the problem ∃IRRATIONALNE
is even decidable.
We next consider the question of deciding whether a given game has a rational
valued Nash equilibrium. This problem is naturally expressible in the existential theory
of the rationals Th∃(Q), which is however not known to be decidable. It is natural to
ask whether the problem ∃RATIONALNE is also ∃Q-hard. An obstacle for such a result
however, is that we do not know a bound on the magnitude of coordinates of rational
solutions to quadratic equations similar to the case of real numbers. We can however
start from a promise version of QUADQ and construct a reduction to ∃RATIONALNE.
We sketch the construction below.
Definition 9. Let QUADQ(B(0,1)) denote the promise problem given by QUADQ to-
gether with the promise that if the given quadratic system has a solution over Q, then
a solution over Q exists in the unit ball B(0,1).
A simple scaling and translation give a reduction from the promise problem of
Definition 9 to the analogue over Q of the promise problem of Proposition 1 and then
further to the analogue over Q of the promise problem of Proposition 2. We shall then
construct a modification of G1 in which the Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) is replaced by
an irrational valued Nash equilibrium. Several examples of 3-player games are known
that are without rational valued Nash equilibria. We give below a simple 3-player zero-
sum game with a unique Nash equilibrium that is irrational valued.
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Definition 10. Let H5 be the 3-player zero-sum game where each player has the ac-
tion set {1,2}, and the payoff vectors are given by the following two matrices, where
Player 1 selects the matrix, Player 2 selects the row, Player 3 selects the column.
1 2
1 (−4,2,2) (−2,1,1)
2 (−2,1,1) ( 0,0,0)
1
1 2
1 ( 0,0,0) (−2,1,1)
2 (−2,1,1) (−6,3,3)
2
We omit the straightforward but tedious analysis of the game H5.
Lemma 9. The unique Nash equilibrium of H5 has Player 1 playing action 1 with
probability 1− 1/√6, and both Player 2 and Player 3 playing the action 1 with prob-
ability 3−√6. The Nash equilibrium payoff profile is (−4(3−√6),2(3−√6),2(3−√
6)).
We can now provide our hardness statement for ∃RATIONALNE.
Theorem 9. There is a polynomial time reduction from the pronmise problem
QUADQ(B(0,1)) to ∃RATIONALNE, and the output of the reduction is a 3-player zero-
sum game.
Proof. Let S be a system of quadratic equations in n variables such that either S has
no solutions in Qn or has a solution in Qn ∩B(0,1)). As explained above we may in
polynomial time transform S into a system S ′ of homogeneous bilinear polynomials
in 2(n+ 1) variables such that S has a solution in Qn if and only if S ′ has a solution
in (Qn+1×Qn+1)∩ (∆n×∆n). Define the 3-player zero-sum game G5 = G5(S ′) to be
the game obtained from G1(S ′) as follows, similarly to the definition of G2.
The action⊥ is for all players replaced by actions (⊥,1) and (⊥,2). When the play-
ers choose the pure strategy profile ((⊥,a1),(⊥,a2),(⊥,a3)) Player 1 receive utility
−2+ 16u1(a1,a2,a3) and Player 2 and Player 3 both receive utility 1+ 16u2(a1,a2,a3) =
1+ 16u3(a1,a2,a3), where u1, u2, and u3 are the utility functions of the game H5. Thus
the payoff profile (−2,1,1) of the strategy profile (⊥,⊥,⊥) is perturbed by the payoffs
of the gameH6, scaled by 16 in order to ensure that each entry is perturbed by at most 1.
As in the proof of Theorem 4, a Nash equilibrium x is either a Nash equilibrium of G0
in which every player receives payoff 0, or is such that the players choose the actions
(⊥,a) according to the unique Nash equilibrium of H5. Since the latter is irrational
valued we conclude that if x is a rational valued Nash equilibrium then x is a rational
valued Nash equilibrium of G0(S ′) in which every player receives payoff 0, which
by Proposition 3 implies a rational valued solution to S ′. Likewise a rational valued
solution of S ′ in ∆n×∆n gives a rational valued Nash equilibrium of G1(S ′), thereby
completing the proof.
4 Decision Problems about Nash Equilibria in Symmet-
ric Games
In this section we consider variations of all the decision problems considered in Sec-
tion 3, where the given input is now a finite strategic form symmetric game D , where
every player share the same set S of pure strategies, together with auxiliary input. As
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before, u denotes a rational number, k an integer, whereas we now consider a single
subset T ⊆ S of actions. The decision problems are described by stating the property
that a symmetric Nash equilibrium xwhose existence is to be determined should satisfy.
We use the same grouping as the problems of Section 3, but now we cover all problems
in the same section.
Problem Condition
∃SNEWITHLARGEPAYOFFS ui(x)≥ u for all i.
∃SNEWITHSMALLPAYOFFS ui(x)≤ u for all i.
∃SNEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF ∑i ui(x)≥ u.
∃SNEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF ∑i ui(x)≤ u.
∃SNEINABALL xi(ai)≤ u for all i and ai ∈ Si.
∃SECONDSNE x is not the only SNE.
∃SNEWITHLARGESUPPORTS |Supp(xi)| ≥ k for all i.
∃SNEWITHSMALLSUPPORTS |Supp(xi)| ≤ k for all i.
∃SNEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS T ⊆ Supp(xi) for all i.
∃SNEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS Supp(xi)⊆ T for all i.
∃NONPARETOOPTIMALSNE x is not Pareto optimal.
∃NONSTRONGSNE x is not a strong NE.
∃PARETOOPTIMALSNE x is Pareto optimal.
∃STRONGSNE x is a strong NE.
∃IRRATIONALSNE xi(ai) 6∈Q for some i and ai ∈ Si.
∃RATIONALSNE xi(ai) ∈Q for all i and ai ∈ Si.
In addition to the above problems about symmetric Nash equilibria, we also shall con-
sider the problem ∃NONSYMMETRICNE, that given a finite strategic form symmetric
game D , asks whether D has a Nash equilibrium x that is nonsymmetric.
∃R membership of all these problems, except for those of the last group above,
follows analogously to the case of their non-symmetric counterparts and will not be
discussed further.
4.1 Symmetrization
Garg et al. [15] constructed a symmetrization transformation of 3-player games to
symmetric 3-player games. This was used to give reductions from the two problems
∃NEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS and ∃NEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS to their
symmetric counterparts, and these were the first problems about symmetric Nash equi-
libria shown to be ∃R-complete. Bilò and Mavronicolas [6], then constructed further
reductions starting from ∃SNEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS.
We can apply a different, but similar symmetrization transformation to the game
G0(S ) of Section 3 obtaining a symmetric game D0(S ) that will form the base of
further reduction as well as giving a direct proof of ∃R-completeness for the problem
∃SNEWITHLARGEPAYOFFS. In addition to our new results, we give for completeness
also proofs of the previous ∃R-completeness results.
The idea of symmetrization is to take a game G , with strictly positive payoffs, and
construct a new symmetric gameD in which the players can take the role of any player
of G . The game G is then played when the players choose distinct roles. The players
are in the construction of Garg et al. [15, Lemma 5.1] incentivized to have this behavior
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by the choice of payoffs (0 or 1) in case the roles of the players overlap. In our case we
can simply let the players be incentivized by the given payoff requirement alone.
Definition 11 (The symmetric 3-player game D0). Let G+ = G+(S ) be the game
obtained from G0(S ) as follows. Let u1, u2, and u3 be the utility functions of G0. Let
M the the smallest (positive) integer such that −M < u1(x) <M for all pure strategy
profiles x. Define the utility functions u′1 and u
′
2 = u
′
3 of G+ by u
′
1(x) = u1(x)+M and
u′2(x) = u
′
3(x) =−u1(x)+M. Thus also, u′2(x) = u′3(x) = 2u2(x)+M = 2u3(x)+M.
For a permutation pi of {1,2,3} we denote by G pi+ = G (pi(1),pi(2),pi(3))+ the game
where Player i has the set of actions Spi(i) and the utility function given by
u′pi(i)(api−1(1),api−1(2),api−1(3)), where ai ∈ Spi(i) is the action chosen by Player i. Thus
G pi+ is just a reordering of the players of G+ such that Player i in G
pi
+ assumes the role
of Player pi(i) in G+.
Define the game D0 = D0(S ) to be the 3-player symmetric form game in which
the players have the set of actions S = S1∪˙S2∪˙S3, which is the disjoint union of the
set of actions S1, S2 and S3 of the players in G0. We also view S1, S2, and S3 as
disjoint sets below. When the players play actions a1, a2, and a3, such that there exists
a permutation pi of {1,2,3} satisfying that ai ∈ Spi(i), for all i, then Player i receives
utility u′pi(i)(api−1(1),api−1(2),api−1(3)). Otherwise, Player i simply receives utility 0. The
payoffs vectors of D0 are illustrated below as a block tensor of payoff vectors, where
Player 1 selects the matrix slice, Player 2 selects the row, and Player 3 selects the
column. We let 0 denote a payoff tensor of any appropriate dimensions in which every
payoff is 0.
S1 S2 S3
S1 0 0 0
S2 0 0 G
(1,2,3)
+
S3 0 G
(1,3,2)
+ 0
S1
S1 S2 S3
S1 0 0 G
(2,1,3)
+
S2 0 0 0
S3 G
(2,3,1)
+ 0 0
S2
S1 S2 S3
S1 0 G
(3,1,2)
+ 0
S2 G
(3,2,1)
+ 0 0
S3 0 0 0
S3
We next relate symmetric Nash equilibria in D0 to Nash equilibria in G0.
Lemma 10. The games G0(S ) and G+(S ) have the same set of Nash equilibria. All
players receive payoff 0 in G0 if and only if the total payoff of the players in G+ is
3M, which is also maximum possible total payoff of the players in G+ in any Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Since the utility functions of G+ are obtained from those of G0 by scaling with
a positive constant and adding a constant, the games have the same set of Nash equi-
libria. Note now that u′1(x) + u
′
2(x) + u
′
3(x) = 3M− u1(x). Since u1(x) ≥ 0 in any
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Nash equilibrium by Lemma 1, the maximum total equilibrium payoff in G+ is 3M.
In G0 all players receive payoff 0 if and only if u1(x) = 0, from which the conclusion
follows.
Proposition 6. Define K = 2M9 , where M is given in Definition 11. Let (x1,x2,x3) be
a Nash equilibrium of G0 in which every player receive payoff 0. Then the strategy
profile (y,y,y) in which every player chooses i ∈ {1,2,3}, each with probability 13 , and
plays an action according to xi is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in D0(S ) in which all
players receive payoff K. Conversely let (y,y,y) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium ofD0
in which every player receives payoff K, which is also the maximum possible payoff of
a symmetric Nash equilibrium ofD0. Then the total probability given to actions of each
set Si is exactly
1
3 . Define xi to be the conditional probability distribution on Si obtained
from y given that an action of Si is played. Then (x1,x2,x3) is a Nash equilibrium of G0
in which every player receives payoff 0.
Proof. First, let x = (x1,x2,x3) be a Nash equilibrium of G0 in which every player re-
ceive payoff 0. By Lemma 10 x is also a Nash equilibrium of G+ given total payoff 3M.
Let y be the strategy that selects each i ∈ {1,2,3} with probability 13 and then chooses
an action according to a xi. Then (y,y,y) must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of D0,
since if a player could improve payoff by a change to a different strategy y′, there would
also be a way for one of the players to improve the payoff in G+. Each player takes
part in playing G+ a total of 6 times, each chosen with probability 127 , and taking the
role of each player 2 times. The payoff to each player is therefore equal to 2273M = K
by Lemma 10.
Assume now that (y,y,y) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of D0. Let pi be the
total probability given to actions of Si, for i ∈ {1,2,3}. Clearly, if pi = 0 for some i
the players receive payoff 0 due to the symmetrization construction of D0. Assume
now that pi > 0 for all i. The conditional probability distributions xi, obtained from
y given that an action of Si is played, are therefore well defined. The strategy profile
x = (x1,x2,x3) is a Nash equilibrium of G+ as otherwise a player could improve the
payoff in D0 as well. By Lemma 10 the total payoff U to the players in G+ is at
most 3M, and equals 3M exactly when x gives payoff 0 to all players in G0. The total
payoff to the players in D0 is therefore equal to 6p1p2p3U ≤ p1p2p318M. By the
AM-GM inequality p1p2p3 ≤ ( 13 (p1 + p2 + p3))3 = 127 with equality if and only if
p1 = p2 = p3 =
1
3 . The maximum total payoff of the players is thus
2
3M = 3K, and
obtaining this requires both that p1 = p2 = p3 =
1
3 and U =M. Thus by Lemma 10,
if (y,y,y) give all players payoff K in D0 then (x1,x2,x3) give all players payoff 0
in G0.
4.2 Decision Problems for Symmetric Nash Equilibria
From Proposition 6 together with Theorem 1 we immediately obtain the first ∃R-
hardness result about symmetric Nash equilibria.
Theorem 10 (Bilò and Mavronicolas [6]). ∃SNEWITHLARGEPAYOFFS and
∃SNEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF are ∃R-complete, even for 3-player games.
As done for the game G0 we now construct simple extensions of the game D0. We
describe these constructions below. For some of the results we give only a proof sketch.
Definition 12 (The symmetric 3-player game D1). Let D1 = D1(S ) be the game ob-
tained from D0(S ) as follows. Each player is given an additional action ⊥. When no
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player plays the action ⊥, the payoffs are the same as in D0. When exactly one player
is playing⊥, every player receives payoff K. When more than one player is playing⊥,
every player receives payoff K+ 1.
Proposition 7. The pure strategy profile (⊥,⊥,⊥) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of
D1 in which every player receives payoff K+1. Any other symmetric Nash equilibrium
is also a symmetric Nash equilibrium of D0 and is such that every player receives
payoff K.
Proof. Let (y,y,y) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of D1 that is different from
(⊥,⊥,⊥). Let y′ be the probability distribution obtained from y given that ⊥ is not
played. Then (y′,y′,y′) must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of D0 in which every
player receive payoff K, since otherwise a player could improve the payoff in D1 by
always playing ⊥. Also it follows that ⊥ is actually played with probability 0 by y,
since otherwise a player could improve the payoff in D1 by always playing ⊥. Thus
y= y′ and the result follows.
The game D1 gives, together with Proposition 3, reductions from the promise
problem of Proposition 2 to most of the problems under consideration, showing ∃R-
completeness. Except for ∃SNEINABALL, this was shown earlier by Garg et al [15]
and Bilò and Mavronicolas [6].
Theorem 11 (Garg et al [15]; Bilò and Mavronicolas [6]). The following problems are
∃R-complete, even for 3-player games:
∃SNEWITHSMALLPAYOFFS, ∃SNEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF,
∃SNEINABALL, ∃SECONDSNE,
∃SNEWITHLARGESUPPORTS, ∃SNEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS,
∃NONPARETOOPTIMALSNE, ∃SNEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS,
∃NONSTRONGSNE.
Proof. Proposition 3, Proposition 6, and Proposition 7 together give a reduction from
the promise problem of Proposition 2 to all the problems under consideration thereby
showing ∃R-hardness, when setting the additional parameters as follows. We let u=K
for ∃SNEWITHSMALLPAYOFFS and we let u = 3K for the similar problem
∃SNEWITHSMALLTOTALPAYOFF. For ∃SNEINABALL we let u = 12 and for
∃SNEWITHLARGESUPPORTS we let k = 2. We let T be the set of all actions except i
for ∃SNEWITHRESTRICTINGSUPPORTS and ∃SNEWITHRESTRICTEDSUPPORTS.
We can proceed in a similar way as Section 3 for the remaining problems concern-
ing symmetric Nash equilibria. In order to adapt the proof of Theorem 4, we need to
replace the Nash equilibrium (⊥,⊥,⊥) in D1 by a symmetric Nash equilibrium with
large supports. Bilò and Mavronicolas [6, Lemma 4] construct for any k a symmetric
m-player zero-sum game with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that is fully mixed
on a set of k strategies. We may use this to perturb the payoff profile of (⊥,⊥,⊥) in
D1 analogously to the proof of Theorem 4 thereby obtaining an alternative proof of
∃R-hardness of ∃SNEWITHSMALLSUPPORTS.
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Theorem 12 (Bilò and Mavronicolas [6]). ∃SNEWITHSMALLSUPPORTS is ∃R-
complete, even for 3-player games.
For the problems ∃PARETOOPTIMALSNE and ∃STRONGSNE we define the game
D4 = D4(S ) extending D0 in an analogous way to the game G4. Namely, each player
is given an additional action⊥. When no player plays the action ⊥, the payoffs are the
same as in D0. When exactly one player is playing ⊥, that player receives payoff K,
whereas the other two players receive payoff K − 3. When exactly two players are
playing⊥, every player receives payoff K−2. Finally, when all players are playing⊥,
every player receives payoff K− 1. Thus the utilities of the players when a player is
playing the action ⊥ are those of H4 added to K. In an analogous way to the proof of
Theorem 7 we may then obtain the following result.
Theorem 13. ∃PARETOOPTIMALSNE and ∃STRONGSNE are ∃R-complete, even for
3-player games.
We now turn to irrational and rational valued symmetric Nash equilibria. Analo-
gously to the proof of Theorem 8, starting with a quadratic system S in which every
solution must involve an irrational valued variable gives via the game D1 a reduction
showing ∃R-hardness for ∃IRRATIONALSNE.
Theorem 14. ∃IRRATIONALSNE is ∃R-hard, even for 3-player games.
To make a symmetric analogue of Theorem 9 we need a 3-player symmetric game
with unique Nash equilibrium that is irrational valued. Rather than giving an explicit
example, we note that the symmetrization transformation of Garg et al. [15] applied to,
say, the game H5 gives precisely such a symmetric game. Using that to extend D1 and
perturb the payoff profile of (⊥,⊥,⊥) we may obtain the following hardness result.
Theorem 15. There is a polynomial time reduction from the promise problem
QUADQ(B(0,1)) to ∃RATIONALNE.
4.3 A Decision Problem about Nonsymmetric Equilibria
Our final result is concerned with the existence of a non-symmetric Nash equilib-
rium in a symmetric game. Our hardness proof is based by a modification of the
games D0 and D1. We note that the game D0 was defined to be a symmetrization
of the game G ′0, used in the ∃R-hardness proof of Theorem 2 of for the problem
∃NEWITHLARGETOTALPAYOFF, with M added to every payoff in order to make all
payoffs strictly positive. This is the appropriate choice for studying symmetric Nash
equilibria, since in a symmetric Nash equilibria of D0 each player takes the role of
every player of G0, thereby accumulating the payoffs of each player (scaled appropri-
ately). For studying nonsymmetric Nash equilibria the idea is force the players to take
on the role of just one player of G0.
Define G ′+ = G ′+(S ) to be the game obtained from G0 by adding M to all pay-
offs, where M is the smallest positive integer such that −M < u1(x) <M. Define D ′0
analogously to D0 with the game G ′+ taking the role of G+. Next, define the game
D ′1 = D
′
1(S ) obtained from D
′
0(S ) by giving each player an additional action ⊥, and
defining the utility function as follows. When no player plays the action ⊥, the pay-
offs are the same as in D ′0. When exactly one player is playing⊥, every player receives
payoffM. When exactly two players are playing⊥, every player receives payoffM+1.
Finally, when all players are playing ⊥, every player receives payoffM+ 2.
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Theorem 16. ∃NONSYMMETRICNE is ∃R-complete, even for 3-player games.
Proof. We show ∃R-hardness by reduction from the promise problem of Proposition 2
by the game D ′1(S ). Consider a strategy profile x
′ = (x1,x2,x3) in the game D ′0. Since
G0 is a zero-sum game, the total payoff received by the players is at most 3M. Fur-
thermore, this is by the construction of D ′0 achievable only when there is a permutation
pi of {1,2,3} such that Supp(x′i) ⊆ Spi(i), where S1, S2, and S3 are the strategy sets of
the players in G0. Thus when the total payoff of the players is 3M we may view the
strategy profile x′ as a strategy profile of G0(S ).
If there exists a strategy profile x′ in G0 in which every player receives payoff 0,
we may conversely view this as a (nonsymmetric) strategy profile of D0(S ) in which
every player receives payoff M. This is also a Nash equilibrium in D1 which is non-
symmetric.
Conversely, consider a Nash equilibrium x of D ′1 that is nonsymmetric, and there-
fore different from (⊥,⊥,⊥). No player can play ⊥ with probability 1, since then ⊥
would be the unique best reply of the other players. Thus we may consider the strategy
profile x′ of D ′0 obtained from x conditioned on that no player is playing ⊥. This must
be a Nash equilibrium of D ′0 in which every player receives payoffM, since otherwise
x would not be a Nash equilibrium of D ′1. As argued above this means that x
′ gives a
Nash equilibrium of G0 in which every player receives payoff 0, thereby completing
the proof using Proposition 3.
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